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I. Introduction
In April 1996 member banks of shared automatic teller machine (ATM) networks (Cirrus, Plus, etc.) were allowed by these networks to impose surcharges on nonbank (also referred to as "foreign") customers using This paper uses a unique database to test the effect of ATM surcharges on larger versus smaller banks. Only nonbank ("foreign") users of ATMs pay ATM surcharges. Customers thus face incentives to switch accounts from smaller banks to larger banks in order to avoid high ATM surcharges. We find that, after we control for other bank factors, higher ATM surcharges result in a greater market share of deposits of larger banks and a lower market share for smaller banks, results that are consistent with customer switching. However, smaller banks can positively affect their market share by establishing larger ATM networks.
their ATMs.
1 This regulatory change has resulted in a public policy debate over whether the ability to impose ATM surcharges benefits large banks and hinders small banks. Several consumer interest groups (e.g. Public Interest Research Group [PIRG] 1999) have argued that ATM surcharges create an incentive for bank customers to switch from smaller banks with smaller ATM networks to larger banks with larger ATM networks. The reason is that only nonbank (foreign) customers pay the ATM surcharge so that a customer belonging to a large bank with many ATMs would be less likely to have to pay ATM surcharges because of free access to this larger network.
The PIRG, for example, has made the argument, regarding the period following the 1996 liberalization, that "large banks in particular were eager to take advantage of their size . . . when competing against smaller banks. The new fees gave the large banks the golden opportunity to advertise that they had far more ATMs than smaller banks, which meant that their customers would have to pay fewer fees for using "foreign" banks' ATMs" (2001, 1) . In a survey of 106 ATMs in New York State in 2002, this group found that 42% of the ATMs they examined displayed advertisements in which the surcharge is disclosed to foreign customers, encouraging these foreign ATM users to "switch their accounts to the bank that owns the ATM to avoid fees." The bank-owned ATMs that included the "switching" advertisements in their surcharge disclosures include Citibank, Fleet Bank, HSBC, and Key Bank (PIRG 2002) . 2 An indication of the importance of ATM surcharges to both banks and consumer lobby groups is the extent of recent litigation around this issue. A case involving the rights of cities or states to impose ATM surcharge bans has recently reached the U.S. Supreme Court. This followed the attempt by the City of San Francisco and other cities to impose bans on ATM surcharges. In May 2003 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the ruling of lower courts, which denied cities and states the right to impose ATM surcharge bans (City of San Francisco et al. v. the Bank of America et al. [no. 02-1404 , 5/27/2003 ).
A theoretical explanation regarding the incentive for banks to set high ATM fees is provided by Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) . Using a spatial model, they endogenize both the pricing of ATM services by banks and the choice of home bank and ATM use by customers. They show that banks impose especially high ATM surcharges on nonmembers (higher than the price they charge for their member customers) because each bank wants to encourage more customers to establish deposit accounts with it. That is, surcharges raise the costs of nonaffiliation with the ATM-supplying bank and encourage switching of accounts. In a variant spatial model, Bernhardt and Massoud (2004) show that banks strategically overprovide their ATM network. This raises the attraction of establishing an account with the bank, increases the bank's potential customer base for the sale of other bank products, and enables banks to extract rents more efficiently from their member customers. 3 The aim of this paper is to empirically examine whether the ability to impose ATM surcharges has indeed benefited larger banks and hindered smaller banks. We use a unique new panel database, which provides us with bank-level data on ATM surcharges, the size of ATM networks, and the percentage of foreign (i.e., nonbank) users of ATMs who have to pay the surcharge. Using this database, we examine the impact that ATM surcharges and ATM network size have on the market share of deposits of larger and smaller banks. We also motivate our study by conducting an event study test of the market reaction to the announcement that banks would be allowed to charge their own ATM surcharges.
While there has been some recent theoretical research on the effects of ATM pricing, a significant impediment to empirical work on this issue has been the lack of data availability. Indeed in his recent literature review, McAndrews (2003) comments that a large amount of empirical work still remains to be conducted on ATMs, including the empirical question of whether "larger banks can use ATMs and surcharges to disadvantage smaller rivals in competition for depositors" (156) .
In this paper, we develop testable hypotheses from the existing theoretical literature on ATMs, in particular the models of Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) and Bernhardt and Massoud (2004) . As discussed above, these papers consider the possibility that ATM surcharges can affect banks' profitability, both directly and indirectly, through a so-called customer switching effect. The direct effect on profitability stems from the direct revenue generated from "foreigners" (i.e., non-bank customers) paying higher ATM surcharges. The indirect effect results from customers at smaller banks with relatively few ATMs switching their deposit accounts to larger banks with a larger number of ATMs in order to avoid paying ATM surcharges. The higher the surcharge at larger 3. Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) also explore how bank size affects ATM pricing. They show that the strategic pricing impacts are greater for larger banks. The intuition behind this result is that because, spatially, consumers are more likely to be near a large bank's ATM, an increase in the large bank's ATM surcharge leads to a greater incentive for smaller bank customers to switch their accounts to larger banks to save on ATM fees. This finding is consistent with PIRG's (2001) concerns that "a surcharging is part of the big bank's anti-competitive strategy to squeeze out smaller banks and credit unions by encouraging their customers to switch their accounts to banks with larger ATM networks." banks, the greater incentive customers have to switch to that bank in order to avoid paying the higher surcharges. If switching occurs from smaller to larger banks, then higher ATM surcharges should enhance the market share of bank products (e.g., deposits) of larger banks and reduce the market share of deposits of smaller banks.
One of the key implications of the Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) model is the argument that consumers will switch banks in order to avoid ATM surcharges. This argument is implicitly based on the premise that the switching costs involved in changing banks are low enough to allow consumers to switch. The issue of switching costs has been extensively debated in the theoretical literature (e.g., Matutes and Padilla 1994) . One of the key contributions of this paper is that it enables us to provide new empirical evidence on the extent of the switching costs involved in changing banks. If we find that banks are able to affect the market share of their deposits by setting a particular ATM surcharge level, then this implies that some switching has occurred and, in turn, that switching costs may not be sufficiently high so as to impede depositors changing banks in response to the imposition of ATM surcharges.
We first motivate the importance of the ATM surcharge issue to banks by using an event study to examine the announcement effect of surcharge liberalization on publicly traded banks. We examine both the day of the original announcement of the policy change and the day of the announcement that the policy implementation had occurred, and we find strong evidence that larger banks had significantly positive abnormal returns whereas smaller banks had either significantly negative abnormal returns or insignificant abnormal returns. This result implies that the market expected a relatively favorable effect on large bank returns and market share relative to smaller banks in the post-1996 period as a result of ATM surcharge liberalization.
We then use our panel database for individual bank ATM surcharges over the 1996-2001 period to examine the actual impact of an increase in surcharge levels. While the direct effect of high surcharges on a bank's revenue will depend on the price elasticity of demand of customers to using ATMs of a foreign bank, 4 the overall effect of the ATM surcharge on a bank's deposit market share will reflect the degree of switching that occurs by customers who move their accounts (and related bank product demands) to the highersurcharge bank in order to avoid paying the larger ATM surcharges imposed on "foreign" users.
We find that the level of ATM surcharges is positively related to the market share of deposits of larger banks in the following year. On the other hand, we find that for smaller banks the level of the surcharge is negatively related to their market share in the following year. This is consistent with bank customers switching accounts from smaller to larger banks to avoid paying surcharges at larger banks. However, we also find that smaller banks can affect 4. If the demand function is inelastic, an increase in surcharge will have a positive direct effect on bank revenues. If the demand curve is elastic, it will have a negative effect on bank revenues. their market share of deposits in the following year by adopting a larger ATM network. Our results thus indicate that larger banks (which already have large ATM networks) are able to generate a larger market share of deposits by setting ATM surcharges at a higher level, whereas smaller banks are able to influence their market share of deposits only by establishing larger ATM networks.
These results are robust across a large variety of econometric specifications, including fixed and random effects panel models and Tobit models. Furthermore, we examine two additional specifications to account for possible endogeneity issues. These are three-stage least-squares (3SLS) models and the log-log panel specification, which tests the model in terms of rates of change.
Section II reviews the previous literature on ATM pricing. Section III assesses the ex ante materiality of the 1996 liberalization of ATM surcharges by examining the market reaction to these announcements. Section IV discusses our hypotheses. Section V describes our panel database, Section VI describes the methodology, and Section VII discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section VIII is a summary and conclusion. Appendix A describes in detail the ATM data employed in this study provided by Dove Consulting Group, Appendix B outlines a theoretical model that provides an economic motivation for the hypotheses tested in the paper, and Appendix C provides details of the 3SLS models used.
II. Previous Literature on ATMs and ATM Pricing
Following the dramatic increase in the number of banks applying a surcharge to their foreign customers, there has also been an increase in research on this issue. Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) , McAndrews (2002) , and Bernhardt and Massoud (2004) have developed theoretical models that introduce and analyze the idea of the indirect (or switching) effect of ATM surcharging on bank profitability. Other research (e.g., Prager 1999 Prager , 2001 Stavins 2000; Hannan et al. 2003) has examined empirically various elements of ATM pricing. A recent literature survey on the economics of ATMs is provided by McAndrews (2003) Prager (2001) examines whether small banks are disadvantaged by ATM surcharges, but she uses state and city market-level (metropolitan statistical area) data rather than the bank-level data used here. Furthermore, Prager's study covers a period prior to the liberalization of ATM surcharging (and the dramatic growth in ATMs) that occurred after 1996.
Other empirical papers in the literature (e.g., Hannan et al. 2003) attempt to identify factors that determine whether a bank sets a surcharge or not. The empirical questions posed by Hannan et al.-the factors determining whether or not a bank imposes a surcharge-were clearly of importance in the context of their 1997 database, when only about half of the banks in their survey imposed ATM surcharges. However, the very large increase in the proportion of banks using ATM surcharges since then (88% of all banks and 98% of large banks had ATM surcharges in 2001 5 ) leads us to ask a different question in this paper: what has been the impact of the surcharge level on bank outcomes and, in particular, on market share of deposits of small versus large banks after the surcharge liberalization?
An important element of this paper concerns the attempts by banks to increase their customer base and strengthen their relationships with their customers by making their ATM networks more attractive. This paper thus contributes to the growing literature on relationship banking, which describes how banks build relationships with customers. Recent papers in this literature include Berger and Udell (1995) and Berlin and Mester (1999) . Before we trace the long-term impact of the post-1996 liberalization of surcharges on bank market share, it is important to establish the materiality of the news of this liberalization on both large and small banks. Specifically, what were the market's (and equity investors') ex ante expectations regarding the potential impact? To the extent that the market (investors) factored in both direct and indirect effects, the more likely it is that the announcement had a material effect on bank stock returns.
To examine this question we conduct event studies of the impact of the various announcements regarding the liberalization of ATM surcharges on bank returns and, in particular, the relative impact of this announcement on large versus small banks. On November 27, 1995, an announcement was made by VISA indicating that in the future banks would be allowed to set their own ATM surcharges. This was quickly followed by similar announcements by other network providers. On April 1, 1996, Cirrus and Plus (which is controlled by VISA) were the first networks to actually announce that they had implemented the ATM surcharge liberalization.
To examine the announcement effects of the proposed (November 27, 1995) and actual (April 1, 1996) surcharge liberalization, we examine first whether there are differences in abnormal returns from portfolios of larger and smaller banks and second whether, with a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach, abnormal returns from individual banks are related to the asset sizes of those banks.
Firstly, using standard event study methodology, we calculated abnormal returns for two portfolios of banks: (i) a portfolio of big banks (with asset size on the event date exceeding $1 billion) and (ii) a portfolio of small banks 5. Data are taken from the Federal Reserve Report to Congress of Retail Fees of Depository Institutions (Hannan 2002) .
6. For detailed discussions of customer relationship effects in a different context, see Ongena and Smith (2001) and Bae, Kang, and Lim (2002) . Mester, Nakamura, and Renault (2003) also show that there is a link between customer checking accounts and the information they generate and other services (such as the provision of loans). is the market return at time t. The event study tests examine how equity R M,t prices for a sample of publicly traded banks responded to the announcement that banks would no longer face restrictions on imposing ATM surcharges. The results indicate that the market believed ex-ante that large banks would benefit from this regulatory change and that small banks would lose. Data are taken from all banks in the Compustat Bank File that have event day returns data available from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data set. Asset size is determined from Compustat as of 1995 and 1996. Return on market model with equally weighted index. The market model is estimated over 255 days in length, ending 10 days before the event day. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significance at 1%.
(with asset size on the event date of less than or equal to $1 billion). Our choice of a cutoff of asset size of $1 billion is the same cutoff used by the Federal Reserve as its definition of "large banks" in the context of its report to Congress on ATM surcharges (see, e.g., Hannan 2001 Hannan , 2002 . The parameters of the market model were estimated over a one-year (255-day) period ending 10 days before the event day. 7 We use both a one-factor and a two-factor model (which includes daily interest rate changes, as well as market returns) in order to account for possible interest rate effects on bank returns (see, e.g., Flannery and James 1984) . To test the significance of the announcement day abnormal returns (AR(n)), we used the Patell Z test. For each of the two event days we examine a large variety of windows around the event date. As can be seen from table 1, the market expected a very 7. Our results are also robust to change of the end date for the market model to a longer period, i.e., 49 days. different impact for the portfolio of larger versus smaller banks. In panel A of table 1 we report the abnormal returns for larger and smaller banks for five different event windows, (Ϫ5, ϩ5), (Ϫ1, 0), (Ϫ1, ϩ1), (0, 0), and (0, ϩ1), where the event day is day 0, and a negative number indicates days before the event day and a positive number indicates days after the event day. In all the windows examined except (Ϫ1, 0), we find that larger banks had a significantly positive abnormal return. For the small banks we find that there is a negative abnormal return for the (Ϫ5, ϩ5) window, with the rest being insignificantly different from zero. In panel B of table 1, we examine the abnormal returns for larger and smaller banks on the day of the implementation of the surcharge policy change, April 1, 1996. Once again our results show that for all the windows examined except (Ϫ5, ϩ5), there was a significant positive abnormal return for the larger banks. For all five of the windows examined we find a significant negative abnormal return for the smaller banks. These results thus indicate that the market generally believed that these regulatory changes would benefit larger banks and hinder smaller banks.
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In order to check the robustness of these event study results, we also examine whether the impact of the abnormal returns of individual banks (rather than the portfolios used above) on our two event days is related to the size of the banks. Using an SUR methodology, we are able to determine the abnormal return for each individual bank in our sample for each of the different event windows around our event dates (see table 2 for summary statistics). We then regress these abnormal returns against the asset size of each bank. A significant positive relationship between bank-specific abnormal returns and asset size will indicate that as banks get bigger the market expects them to enjoy a greater benefit from the ability to impose their own ATM surcharges.
Our results from these regressions of bank-specific abnormal returns and asset size are reported in table 3. Once again we examine abnormal returns from five different event windows, for both event days. With the exception of the (Ϫ1, 0) event window, we find a significant positive relationship between asset size and bank-specific abnormal return for all the other event windows around both event days. These results strongly support the hypothesis that the market believed that the larger the bank, the greater the positive impact an ability to strategically impose independent ATM surcharges would have.
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Having established that the equity markets did expect that the liberalization of ATM surcharges would benefit larger banks and not smaller banks, we now turn to an evaluation of whether this actually occurred in the post-1996 period.
8. These results are robust for both the one-factor and the two-factor models. 9. Our results are robust across both the one-factor and the two-factor models. Note.-The table provides summary statistics for abnormal return for a sample of traded banks for two events. Panel A presents the summary statistics of abnormal return for the event on November 27, 1995, the first announcement of the intention of removing the ATM surcharge ban on April 1 1996. Panel B presents the summary statistics of abnormal return for the event on April 1, 1996, the actual date of removing the ATM surcharge ban. To obtain estimates of bank-specific abnormal return, we use the SUR approach. We estimate a model of the realized daily stock return for each bank on a measure of the realized daily return market index, nominal daily yield on 90-day Treasury bill, and a set of daily dummies , where ,
, t, which take the value of one for days inside the event window and zero outside the window; 
IV. Testable Hypotheses
In the reminder of the paper we test the following three hypotheses. A theoretical justification for these is shown in Appendix B. On the basis of the discussion of these models we can examine three testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. The higher a bank's ATM surcharge, the lower the proportion of its users will be foreign users, that is, those who have to pay the higher surcharge.
Hypothesis 2. The higher the ATM surcharge of a bank, the larger the market share of deposits as customers switch to that bank to avoid paying the surcharges.
Hypothesis 3. The larger the size of a bank's ATM network, the larger the market share of deposits as customers switch to that bank to avoid paying surcharges.
These three hypotheses are discussed in more detail below. 
cumulative abnormal return for bank i from day l to day q, and asset is the natural logarithm of bank-specific assets. Panel A presents OLS results for the event on November 27, 1995, the first announcement of removing the ATM ban on April 1, 1996. Panel B presents OLS estimates for the event on April 1, 1996, the effective date of removing the ban. To obtain estimates of abnormal return, using the SUR approach (see Flannery and James [1984] for more on the SUR methodology), we estimate a two-factor model of the realized daily stock return for each bank on a measure of the realized daily return market index, a daily interest rate for one-year Treasury bills, and a set of daily dummies.See also the note to table 2. Data are taken from all banks in the Compustat Bank File that have event day returns data available from the CRSP data set. Asset size is determined from Compustat as of 1995 and 1996. Return on market model with equally weighted index.
* Significance at 10%. ** Significance at 5%. *** Significance at 1%.
A. The Impact of ATM Surcharges on Foreign Usage
Our initial hypothesis relates to the impact of ATM surcharges on the percentage of foreign users of ATMs-who are the only customers who have to pay surcharges. Standard economics, as well as the Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) and Bernhardt and Massoud (2004) models, indicates that the higher the price of this service, the lower the proportion of surcharge-paying foreign customers who use the service, relative to customers who do not pay. Thus we predict a negative relationship between the level of the ATM surcharge and the percentage of foreigners who use ATMs at a particular bank. It should be noted that a negative coefficient on the relationship between ATM surcharges and foreign percentage is consistent only with the hypothesis that a customer's behavior does indeed respond when ATM surcharges are imposed. Foreign usage could decline, however, either because customers switch or move to banks with larger ATM networks or, alternatively, because they simply do not access foreign ATMs as frequently as they did prior to ATM surcharge increases.
B. The Impact of ATM Surcharges on the Market Share for Deposits
Our second testable hypothesis examines the relationship between the level of ATM surcharges and the market share of deposits. The switching effect argues that a bank may be able to induce noncustomers to switch their deposit accounts to that bank by setting a high ATM surcharge. The customers who are most likely to switch are those who are most likely to use the bank's ATM network but would have to pay the high surcharge if they remained a foreign customer.
The key distinction between larger and smaller banks is that if a larger bank (with a larger ATM network) increased its ATM surcharge, there are likely to be more foreign customers who use that larger network because of the increased convenience of that network and thus face an incentive to switch their deposit accounts to that bank. In other words, a higher ATM surcharge set by a larger bank should result in a larger market share of that bank. On the other hand, if a smaller bank set a higher ATM surcharge, it is not clear that there will be many, if any, foreign customers who would face an incentive to switch to the smaller bank. Indeed smaller banks may lose market share relative to larger banks if depositors are switching to larger banks.
An important factor to consider when attempting to empirically capture switching behavior is that there is likely to be a lag between a bank setting an ATM surcharge and a customer deciding to switch deposit accounts to that bank. It is for this reason that in all our empirical estimates we measure the relationship between the ATM surcharge in year t and deposit market share in the following year (year ). t ϩ 1
C. The Impact of ATM Network Size on Market Share for Deposits
Our third testable hypothesis concerns the relationship between the ATM network size and the market share of deposits. We argue here that the more extensive the ATM network of a bank, given any ATM surcharge, the more likely it will be for customers to switch to that bank because they are attracted by the convenience of that bank's larger ATM network, and in order to avoid paying the ATM surcharge for the use of that network.
Once again, because of the lag between the establishment of a given ATM network size and a customer's decision to switch to another bank, we empirically examine the relationship between ATM network size in time t and deposit market share in the following year (year ). t ϩ 1
V. Data
A major impediment to the empirical testing of the various predictions from the theoretical literature is a lack of data on ATMs. In this paper we make use of a very rich new database made available to us by Dove Consulting of Boston (the 1999 and 2002 ATM Deployer Studies). These data provide specific details by bank and year regarding level of ATM surcharge, ATM network size, percent use of a bank's ATM network by foreigners, and other pertinent ATM-related data. The panel database covers a large number of banks of different sizes over six years. An indication of the richness of this database is that our paper is the first to be able to include data on the foreign percentage of ATM users-a key variable for determining the impact of ATM surcharges on ATM usage. Our paper is also the first to utilize bank-level panel data to examine this issue.
For each of the banks in the Dove survey, we also collected additional data from a variety of sources. For example, we collected balance sheet data for each of these banks from the Federal Reserve Call Reports (Statements of Condition and Income). We also collected market share data from the Federal Reserve database on the market share of deposits. Considerable time and effort were expended in matching these different data from the different databases across different banks and across different years. We eliminate from our database all data in which a bank merger has occurred since this will affect our measure of market share. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the data used in this study.
The Dove data are based on survey data generated by Dove Consulting in two reports on ATM deployment and pricing: the first in 1999 and the second in 2002. As discussed in Appendix A, not every variable was available each year, and the sample of banks differed over the 1999 and 2002 surveys. Nevertheless, the richness of these data across both larger and smaller banks allows us to examine the hypotheses outlined above.
In terms of our hypotheses described above, we have two dependent variables of interest, the foreign percentage (hypothesis 1) and the market share of deposits (hypotheses 2 and 3). Since switching is likely to occur with a lag, we analyze the impact of surcharge or network size in the current year (year t) on market share one year ahead (year ). Our two key explanatory t ϩ 1 variables are the ATM surcharge and the ATM network size. Our data for ATM surcharge, ATM network size, and foreign percentage are taken from the Dove surveys. Our data on market share of deposits are taken from Federal Reserve data on bank market share, which measure the percentage of a bank's total deposits in the state in which the bank is located.
We add to these independent variables a variety of control variables, which are taken from Call Report data as well as the Dove surveys. The Call Reports used were those that most closely matched the dates of the Dove surveys. The variables derived from Call Reports were a measure of bank risk (the bank capital-asset ratio) and two measures of bank size (bank assets and number of employees). We also include as a control variable a yearly measure for the average certificate of deposit interest rate. This measure reflects the opportunity cost of holding cash (which can influence the use of ATMs) as well as changes over the business cycle. Thus when we examine the determinants of market share, for example, we are able to control for the variables that usually explain bank market share, including bank assets, bank employees, and a bank's capital ratio. Thus if we find significant coefficients on ATM surcharge and ATM network size, it implies that these factors influence market share while controlling for the other bank-level variables.
As additional control variables we also included the Dove measure of geographic dispersion of a bank's ATM network. This is a relatively rough measure used by Dove, in which they simply divide the United States into seven regions (plus one region for "international"), and identifies whether a bank has ATMs in each region and outside the United States (internationally), making eight possible regions in all. The geographic dispersion variable reflects the number of these regions over which a bank locates its ATMs.
As in the case of our event study results reported above, we differentiate between larger and smaller banks on the basis of whether the bank assets are above or below $1 billion. This is the same cutoff used by the Federal Reserve when describing ATM surcharges in its Annual Report to Congress of Retail Fees of Depository Institutions (see, e.g., Hannan 2001 Hannan , 2002 .
VI. Empirical Methodology
In order to examine the different relationships described above, we use four different empirical methodologies in order to check for the robustness of our results. Our first set of tests are panel data tests across individual banks and across time (six years). We utilize traditional panel data techniques including fixed effects and random effects estimation.
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Our second set of tests involves Tobit estimation. In our models the dependent variables are measured as a percentage (i.e., either foreign percentage or market share of deposits). In order to account for the fact that the dependent variable is bounded between zero and 100%, we use Tobit analysis. In order to account for the panel data nature of our models, we also include banklevel dummies in our Tobit models to capture bank-level fixed effects.
One issue that may affect the interpretation of our results is the issue of endogeneity, particularly in the case in which our dependent variable is market share of deposits. It could be argued, for example, that a high market share of deposits may cause a bank to set a high ATM surcharge. One important issue to note in this regard is that all our empirical tests have the dependent variable of market share measured at year (the following year) with the t ϩ 1 independent variables (e.g., ATM surcharge) measured contemporaneously (year t). It would be hard to make the case that future (one-year-ahead) market share causes the current ATM surcharge. Nevertheless, in order to control for any remaining endogeneity issues, we utilize two further model specifications: a panel log-log specification and a 3SLS specification.
Our third specification, the panel log-log specification, focuses on the effect of a percentage change in ATM surcharges on percentage changes in foreign 10. To determine the most appropriate panel model, we employ the Hausman test statistic. The null hypothesis under the Hausman test statistic is whether the random effects model is appropriate. Where the Hausman test indicates that the random effects model is appropriate, we report the random effects model. If not, we report the fixed effects model. usage and market share.
11 One advantage of looking at percentage changes in ATM surcharges rather than levels is that the level of ATM surcharges may be affected by more extraneous factors, compared to ATM surcharge percentage changes. That is, the percentage change in the ATM surcharge may better control for the potential endogeneity problems. 12 In addition, it provides insights into how increases in the ATM surcharge, rather than just the level of the surcharge, affect bank customer behavior.
The fourth specification seeks to control for potential endogeneity problems by estimating a four-equation 3SLS system. Once again we include banklevel dummy variables (fixed effects) in each equation of this system to account for the panel nature of our data. The four dependent variables in our system are market share of depositors (one year ahead), foreign percentage, ATM surcharge, and ATM network size. By capturing all these equations simultaneously in a 3SLS system, we are able to account for possible endogeneity in the relationship between bank strategic variables (ATM surcharge and network size) and outcomes (market share of deposits and foreign percentage).
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Details of the 3SLS system are provided in Appendix C.
VII. Results
As described above, we are interested in three particular relationships: (i) the impact of the ATM surcharge on foreign percentage usage, (ii) the impact of the ATM surcharge on one-year-ahead market share, and (iii) the impact of ATM network size on one-year-ahead market share. As discussed above, in order to examine the robustness of our results, we provide estimates of these relationships using four econometric methodologies: (i) standard panel models with either fixed or random effects, (ii) Tobit models with bank fixed effects, (iii) a log-log specification with either fixed or random effects, and (iv) a 3SLS system with bank fixed effects. The panel, Tobit, and log-log results for the foreign usage model are reported in table 4; the panel, Tobit, and loglog results for the market share model in table 5; and the 3SLS results with all four equations in table 6. For each of our tests we report results for both larger banks, which have assets above $1 billion, and smaller banks, which have assets of less than $1 billion. For larger banks, the results for all our hypotheses are robust across all four econometric specifications; for smaller banks our results are robust across most of our econometric specifications.
11. As in the case of the panel-level specification, we also use the Hausman test in the loglog specification to determine whether the fixed or random effects panel model is more appropriate.
12. We also examined a change on change specification. Unfortunately, too many observations were lost to make the results statistically meaningful.
13. As described above, we measure the impact of ATM surcharge and ATM network size on market share in the following year (lead). In our 3SLS system we measure the market share lead when market share is a dependent variable and the market share (contemporaneous) when market share is an independent variable. (C1) in App. C. The dependent variable, foreign percentage, measures the percentage of ATM users who have to pay the ATM surcharge because they are nonmembers (nondepositors) of the bank. Members of the bank do not have to pay the ATM surcharge. A negative coefficient on the surcharge variable indicates that the higher the surcharge, the lower the proportion of ATM users who pay the surcharge. For the Hausman tests, for panel and log-log models, re indicates use of random effects and fe indicates use of fixed effects. p-values are in parentheses. Tobit models include bank-level fixed effects. In the log-log panel models all variables are logged.
* p-value of 10%. ** p-value of 5%. *** p-value of 1%.
A. The Impact of ATM Surcharge on Foreign Percentage Usage
Hypothesis 1 developed above indicates that a higher ATM surcharge level should reduce the proportion of customers who pay a surcharge (foreigners); that is, we expect a negative coefficient on the relationship between ATM surcharge and foreign percentage usage. This should apply to both large and small banks and indicates that ATM surcharge levels do affect customer behavior. Our empirical specification is (C2) in App. C. The dependent variable, market share of deposits, is measured as a percentage deposit market share that a bank has in the state in which a bank is located. A positive (negative) coefficient on the surcharge or number of ATM variables indicates that the higher the ATM surcharge or ATM network size, the higher (lower) the market share of deposits will be in the following year. Also see the note to table 4.
where i denotes bank, t denotes time, j denotes portfolio (larger or smaller bank), and u i,j represents the bank-specific residual. We report panel, Tobit, and log-log results for the foreign percentage relationship in table 4 and the results for this relationship from the 3SLS procedure in table 6 (the ATM surcharge variable in the foreign percentage equation). In general, our results are robust across all four econometric methodologies used. We find a significant negative relationship between the level of ATM surcharges and the foreign usage of larger banks, and no significant relationship at the 5% level for smaller banks. 14 These results indicate that if larger banks set their ATM surcharges at relatively higher levels, a lower proportion of foreign users (who have to pay the surcharge) will use those ATMs. This indicates that for the larger banks at least, customers will reduce their demand for using foreign ATMs if the surcharge level is high.
There are a number of possible reasons why we do not find evidence of a strongly significant negative relationship for smaller banks. Foreign customers may be insensitive to changes in ATM surcharges if they do not usually access the foreign ATMs of smaller banks because such banks have very few ATMs in their network. Alternatively, foreigners may be insensitive to small bank ATM surcharges if small banks are located in isolated locations with few alternatives, in which case a higher surcharge level would not decrease the proportion of foreigners using that ATM.
Our finding that, for large banks, foreign customers will reduce their demand when the surcharge level is higher indicates that these customers are indeed price sensitive to ATM surcharges and that ATM surcharges can indeed affect customer behavior. We now examine whether ATM surcharges can actually result in customers switching between banks.
B. The Impact of the ATM Surcharge on the Market Share of Deposits
Hypothesis 2 above argued that the level of the ATM surcharge would positively affect the market share of deposits if foreign users were persuaded to shift their deposits to a bank with the higher surcharge level in order to avoid paying that surcharge. Our empirical specification is Market Share(t ϩ 1) p w ϩ w Surcharge
i, j i ,t, j where i denotes bank, t denotes time, j denotes portfolio (larger or smaller bank), and u i,j represents the bank-specific residual. The coefficient on surcharge in this equation is important for the hypothesis described in this sub-14. The coefficient of ATM surcharge is significantly negative at the 10% level in the log-log model for the smaller banks. section, whereas the coefficient on number of ATMs is important for testing our third hypothesis in subsection C.
Our panel, Tobit, and log-log results for this relationship are reported in table 5, and our 3SLS results are reported in the market share equation in  table 6 .
We find in all four econometric specifications that, for larger banks, there is a significant positive relationship between the ATM surcharge and the market share in the following year, after controlling for other bank variables. For smaller banks there is a significantly negative relationship in three out of the four specifications. The relationship for smaller banks is statistically insignificant with the log-log specification. One possible reason for this is that the smaller bank sample is weakened by the relatively larger loss of observations of those banks with zero ATM surcharges (since the log of zero is undefined). Alternatively, smaller banks' market shares are affected by the absolute level of the ATM surcharge rather than the percentage change in that level.
Our findings for the larger banks are consistent with the argument that those larger banks that set their ATM surcharge levels high will increase their market share by inducing foreign users of their ATMs to switch their deposit accounts into those banks in order to avoid paying higher surcharges.
The negative coefficient on the relationship between the level of the ATM surcharge and market share in the following year for smaller banks indicates that if smaller banks establish high ATM surcharges, they will not be able to persuade depositors to switch to that bank. Indeed, the lower market share of smaller banks is consistent with smaller bank customers switching to larger banks and increasing the larger bank's relative market shares.
C. The Impact of ATM Network Size on the Market Share of Deposits
Hypothesis 3 above argued that the larger the number of ATMs in a bank's network, given any surcharge level, the greater the incentive for a customer to switch to that bank in order to access the convenience of that ATM network without paying the ATM surcharge. Our results for the panel, Tobit, and loglog estimates are reported in table 5 and for the 3SLS estimates in the market share (lead) equation of table 6. For larger banks we find that the number of ATMs in a bank's network has no significant impact on its market share. For smaller banks, however, we find that the more extensive the ATM network provided, the greater the bank's market share, although from the log-log panel specification we find that a (small) percentage change in network size does not induce a positive percentage change in bank market share.
The results for the smaller banks are of particular interest, especially in light of the results reported above that smaller banks are not able to affect their market share through the level of their ATM surcharge. Our results indicate that smaller banks, however, are able to positively affect their market share by establishing a larger ATM network-thus attracting customers who will find the convenience of larger ATM networks attractive.
There may be a variety of reasons explaining why for larger banks the number of ATMs is not a significant determinant of market share. It may be that customers already assume that larger banks have large ATM networks, without actually considering the specific number of ATMs in each network. It is not clear whether customers actually know the number of ATMs of, for example, Citibank, but they will believe that it is a "large" and thus convenient network. For a small local bank, on the other hand, it seems plausible that customers will be able to judge the number of ATMs provided in a local market and make judgments as to whether to switch to or from that bank based on those perceptions.
These results have important strategic policy implications for smaller banks. They show that smaller banks, which are not able to attract switchers by raising ATM surcharges, can raise their market share through more extensive ATM provision.
VIII. Summary and Conclusion
This paper has examined whether allowing banks to set their ATM surcharge in an unconstrained fashion benefits large banks relative to small banks. The issue of whether customers may switch their accounts from smaller banks to larger banks in order to avoid paying high ATM surcharges at the larger banks has been central to much of the policy discussion on ATM surcharges as well as the theoretical discussion on this topic. This paper is the first to empirically address this issue by using disaggregated bank-level data on ATM surcharge pricing. We are able to conduct this study because of our access to a newly available and very rich data source on ATMs, made available by Dove Consulting.
In order to motivate the importance of this issue, we show first that on the days of the announcement and implementation of ATM surcharge liberalization, publicly traded large banks experienced a significantly positive abnormal stock return reaction, whereas the market valuation of small banks had either an insignificant or a significantly negative abnormal return reaction. This is an indication that the market expected such policy changes to benefit larger banks and hinder smaller banks.
We then examine if such expectations were justified by examining how ATM surcharges and ATM network size affected the market share of deposits of larger and smaller banks in the period after ATM surcharge liberalization. We build a new panel database made up of bank-level ATM data from Dove, market share data from the Federal Reserve, and balance sheet data from Call Reports. We show first that a high ATM surcharge level will result in a lower percentage of (surcharge-paying) foreigners using ATMs. This is an indication that ATM surcharges can affect customer behavior. Second, if the level of surcharges is high for both larger and smaller banks, larger banks will have a significantly larger market share of deposits in the following year and smaller banks will have a significantly smaller market share in deposits in the following year. We interpret this finding to be consistent with a customer switching effect, implying that customers will shift their deposits from smaller to larger banks in order to avoid paying ATM surcharges. We also found that increases in the ATM surcharge had effects on larger banks' market share directionally similar to those found with the level tests. For smaller banks, however, the level of ATM surcharge, rather than its percentage change, appears to affect customer behavior. Finally, we show that while smaller banks cannot positively affect their market share through ATM surcharges, they can potentially affect it by establishing a more extensive ATM network.
Appendix A Data Issues: The Panel Data Base
An important aspect of this paper lies in the uniqueness of the ATM data set employed in our tests. This data set was purchased from Dove Consulting, Boston, and includes bank-level data on a range of variables that have not previously been used in the empirical ATM literature. In particular, the data include a measure of the percentage of ATM users for different banks who are foreigners, that is, those who pay ATM surcharges. We spent considerable effort in matching the Dove survey data with other bank-level data used in the paper, including Call Reports (Report of Condition and Income) taken from the Federal Reserve's Web site as well as Federal Reserve market share data.
The data base provided by Dove Consulting is taken from two separate surveys of ATM providers: one taken in 1998 and the second in 2001. (The Dove reports themselves were published in 1999 and 2002, respectively.) In each case data were collected from each bank in the sample for the preceding three years, generating a six-year sample that spans 1996-2001. The two surveys are not identical across the two time periods; thus some data are available for some subset of the time period only. For example, while each of the two Dove surveys asked respondents for information on a variety of variables for each of the preceding three years, this was not the case for the foreign percentage variable. The first survey conducted during 1998 did ask for these data for each of the preceding three years; however, the second survey asked the respondents for these data only for the final year of that survey (i.e., 2001) . In other words, in some of our empirical tests, for example, those that require the use of the foreign percentage variable, we use a data set made up of a given set of banks for each of 1996, 1997, and 1998 and different banks in 2001. A further issue with our data concerns how the banks were asked to report their ATM surcharges over the preceding three years. In the case of both the 1998 and 2001 surveys, banks were asked to provide data on their ATM surcharges at the time of the survey. They were also asked to provide the date of the last change of the surcharge and how much that change was (in dollars and cents). This information is enough to create a partial historical record of surcharges charged by each bank. For example, if the date of the previous surcharge change occurred prior to the three-year period covered by the survey, then we are able to use the value of the surcharge in the final year of the survey for all the previous three years. Similarly, if the most recent surcharge change occurred during the preceding three years, we are able to infer surcharges after that date. However, we would not be able to infer surcharges outside the three-year window of each data set. In cases in which we are not able to infer the surcharge amount from the data, we do not use the data. Another variable employed is the measure of geographic dispersion of a bank's ATM network. Dove divides the United States into seven regions and identifies whether each bank (in each year) has an ATM in one of those regions plus whether ATMs are held internationally (making eight regions). The seven U.S. regions identified were New England, Mid-Atlantic, Southeast, South, Midwest, Mountain and Pacific. The geographic dispersion variable takes a value between one and eight, where the value of the variable reflects the sum of the regions in which a bank locates its ATMs. For example, if geographic dispersion is equal to one, it indicates an ATM presence in only one region; if it is higher than one, it indicates presence in more than one region. In table A1 we provide a summary of the panel data used in the paper.
Appendix B Theoretical Underpinnings: The Impact of ATM Surcharges and ATM Network Size
This appendix provides a theoretical framework that contributes to the development of the hypotheses tested in this paper. We utilize the theoretical framework of Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) and Bernhardt and Massoud (2004) to analyze the impact of ATM surcharge and ATM network size on bank market share (and thus on bank profitability).
In Bernhardt and Massoud (2004) , a spatial game is considered between two banks, A and B. Each bank is associated with a distinctive spatial line of length Q, and each bank chooses the density of its ATM network on a distinctive line where ATM services can be obtained.
There is a measure n of bank customers. Customers are distinguished by how much they value one bank intrinsically. The relative valuation for bank A is uniformly distributed over the range [Ϫm, m] . In addition to providing bank deposits and other products, banks provide ATM services for members and nonmembers (so-called foreign users). First, customers establish a bank account at a local bank. Customers are then hit with a bank-specific location shock that is uniformly distributed over the range [0, Q] . Each customer receives incremental utility M from consuming bank services. The transportation cost of acquiring a service is Td, where d is the distance traveled to the closest ATM and T is an incremental transportation cost. Each bank chooses an ATM service fee to members and nonmembers, , where for members, j P (d) d p 1 for nonmembers, and j is bank A or bank B.
15 Here bank product charges ( ) j d p 0 F are broadly defined to include returns from investing in assets (e.g., making loans) backed by relatively low-cost deposits. Stavins (2000) among others argues that the fee banks charge their own customers for using their own ATM machines is invariably zero, so that ATM fees here are isomorphic to a bank's ATM surcharges on foreign users.
A. Timing of the Game
In stage 1, banks maximize profits by choosing the density of their ATM locations and the prices charged for different services (e.g., ATM surcharge to foreign users). In stage 2, each customer chooses a bank at which to establish an account. In stage 3, each customer receives a bank-specific location shock 16 and chooses where to obtain his or her ATM service (this is a simple one-shot game).
The expected profit function of bank A is
where is the number of bank j's customers, is the marginal cost of providing N C j ATM ATM services to nonmembers, is the cost of installing each ATM machine, C a is the proportion of foreigners as customers (i.e., bank B customers in this game A y (0) 15. Here members are the depositors who hold deposit accounts at the bank. 16. A location shock introduces mobility into the game, as a representation of real-life conditions faced by bank customers.
17. For simplicity, we consider a reduced form of the profit function in which the in-branch service fee and the ATM service fees for members are set equal to their marginal cost. using bank A's ATMs), a A is ATM density chosen by bank A, and is the ATM A p (0) surcharge fee bank A charges bank B customers. The first term in equation (B1) is the bank's profit from members' use of bank products such as deposits and loans, the second term is the profit from nonmembers (i.e., foreigners) who use bank A's ATM services, and the last term is the cost of installing the ATM network.
When a bank chooses its optimal ATM surcharge, it takes into consideration how that surcharge would directly affect its profitability, which depends on foreign customers' demand elasticity, as well as the indirect effects on its profitability as a result of switching. That is, the effect of ATM pricing on a bank's profitability can be decomposed into two effects: a direct effect and an indirect effect. Using the dynamic programming technique, we can solve for the equilibrium outcome of the model. To motivate our hypothesis, in the next sections in this appendix, we focus on the strategic action of banks to maximize their profits.
B. Bank Surcharge: The Direct and Indirect Effects
The effects of a marginal change in the ATM surcharges on a bank's profitability are shown by the following first-order condition: is the loss in surcharge revenues from those foreign customers (i.e., bank B customers in this model) who switch bank membership to bank A as a result of the increase in ATM surcharges. 18 The third and last term in equation (B2),
shows the direct effect of ATM surcharges on bank A's profitability, which is the impact of increasing ATM surcharges on surcharge profits from (foreign) customers who continue to establish bank accounts at competing bank B. The third and last term in equation (B2), or the direct effect, can be rewritten in terms of nonmembers' ATM demand elasticity, y: 
C. ATM Intensity: The Direct and Indirect Effects
The effects of a marginal change in the ATM intensity (also referred to as ATM network size) on a bank's profitability is shown by the following first-order condition: shows the direct effect of ATM intensity on bank A's profitability, which is the impact of higher ATM intensity on increasing surcharge profits from (foreign) customers who continue to establish bank accounts at competing bank B.
19. Tirole (1994, 66) shows that when the elasticity of demand is less than one, the monopolist's revenue-and his profits-is decreasing in quantity. Our model is one of oligopoly, i.e., bank A and bank B, but the results will hold for any non-perfectly competitive market for banking services. Given barriers to entry into the U.S. banking industry, it is not unreasonable to view the U.S. banking industry as imperfectly competitive. 
Appendix C The Structure of the 3SLS Model
Our four-equation system used in our 3SLS model in table 6 is as follows:
Foreign Percentage p v ϩ v Surcharge i, j 0,j 1, j i ,t, j encourage switching. As can be seen from table 6, however, the coefficient on this variable is insignificant. The key conclusion from the estimation of this 3SLS system is that the 3SLS results from equations (C1) and (C2) in the system are generally consistent with those found for the single-equation results reported in tables 4 and 5.
